Saudi-US relations: What next
American politicians consider the stance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the recent OPEC Plus meetings as an insult to US President Joe Biden, who visited Riyadh last July. And currently, they are busy defining the appropriate steps to deal with the Kingdom, indicating the start of a new chapter of tension between the two parties.
The Gulf House Center for Studies and Publishing said that despite Riyadh’s haste to justify the matter, it is difficult to be convinced that the agreement to set a production ceiling at the OPEC Plus meeting was purely technical, far from political calculations.
Energy, since the discovery of oil, has been a weapon in building alliances and directing political messages at the international level. Russia was not the first country to use energy as a weapon against the West during the current war in Ukraine.
In this context, it is difficult to digest the American accusation that Saudi Arabia chose to side with Russia in the conflict, as the Saudi position in the OPEC Plus meeting is consistent with the Kingdom’s view of itself as a country whose influence is growing in the world.
Currently, Saudi-US relations are at a critical juncture. Perhaps the most prominent problematic files are the Iranian and Yemeni files:
Concerning the Iranian file, Saudi Arabia is increasingly concerned about what Riyadh sees as the waning American interest in its security with the possibility of returning to the nuclear agreement signed with Iran in 2015, especially since the nuclear talks are only related to Iran’s nuclear program, and do not address the security threats posed by Tehran’s allies and proxies to Saudi interests and orientations in the Middle East.
Although the nuclear talks are currently frozen until after the midterm elections in the United States on November 8, Riyadh is apprehensive that Washington will make concessions in the upcoming rounds.
In the Yemeni file, the situation is not much different in terms of the difference in the two positions. The direct US intervention in Yemen dates back to 2002 when it began launching military strikes against the leaders of Al-Qaeda.
When the Saudi-led Decisive Storm broke out on March 26, 2015, to end the influence of the Houthis in the country, which had descended into a wide internal war, the US role was limited to providing logistical and intelligence support in conjunction with pressure on Riyadh to contribute to creating a peaceful settlement and ending the fighting between the rival Yemeni factions.
The Houthis’ strength did not weaken as Riyadh had hoped when its air raids launched on the group’s strongholds. Instead, Saudi territory became a primary target for the Houthis, which reached its climax on March 19-20, 2022, with the group targeting energy-related facilities in Jizan, Yanbu, Dhahran, and Khamis Mushait.
Thus, Saudi dissatisfaction with the American ally, which did not form the appropriate security umbrella to protect vital Saudi installations from targeting, increased.
Regarding the previous two files, some point to an issue that may seem very significant in its impact: the lack of appropriate chemistry between President Joe Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Former US diplomat Aaron David Miller, a senior researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, attributes the direct cause of the tension in Saudi-American relations to the rise of the crown prince, who emerged “as a cruel… and someone who submits to his rule in the matter.” It relates to the interests of the United States and American foreign policy to question,” as he described it.
During his run for the presidency, Joe Biden talked about Saudi Arabia as a pariah country. Then, one month after he arrived at the White House, in February 2021, he allowed the publication of the US intelligence report on the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
At that time, the relationship seemed to begin to take an upward trend, followed by Biden’s statement in October 2021, when he linked the rise in oil prices to record levels with Saudi Arabia and “a lot of people in the Middle East who want to talk to him.”
Then the Ukrainian war came to reshuffle the files, and in July of this year, Biden found himself flying on his presidential plane to Riyadh to meet the king and his son, the crown prince.
The move was a clear victory for bin Salman more than it was for Biden, who turned out to have reneged on many of his campaign pledges.
Bin Salman seems to view the American president with suspicion and sees – with the age difference – that time passes Biden and that the relationship with the United States is not based on partnership with personalities that may change after each electoral entitlement.
Accordingly, sending messages to Washington at an appropriate time does not hurt to be more careful in dealing with Riyadh’s interests, and there is no better timing for sending messages than the energy war waged by Russia and the approaching midterm elections in the United States that live on fears of inflation and high fuel prices.
According to researcher Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institution, “the rise in oil prices was a clear electoral interference by the Saudi crown prince on behalf of Donald Trump’s Republican party.”
And Saudi Arabia, since King Salman took power in 2015, seemed willing to conduct a process of evaluating the relationship with the United States, which is seen in the West as a “client relationship” based on the principle of “oil for security,” in which Riyadh guarantees the flow of oil to global markets, especially the American ones, while The United States is responsible for the security of the Kingdom and concludes huge arms deals with it.
The United States, which has become less dependent on Middle Eastern oil, has no interest in supporting internal conflicts or proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The emergence of China as a strategic player at the international level, the Russian war in Ukraine, and the danger of weapons of mass destruction are files that have become more important to Washington than the Middle East issues as long as the Abraham agreements between Israel and the Arab countries deepen day after day.
The danger that the relationship between Riyadh and Washington is going through is not that difficult to predict. Their relations had already gone through critical stages at different times. Still, they remained stable and refractory and did not follow a straight line since the meeting with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt with King Abdulaziz aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal in 1945.
Among its most prominent turning points: the oil embargo on the West during the 1973 war, the attacks of September 11, 2001, Washington’s abandonment of its historical ally President Hosni Mubarak during the January 2011 revolution, and the American position in general regarding the events of the so-called “Arab Spring.”
Washington may delay the delivery of Riyadh as a punishment for the results of OPEC Plus, defence equipment, or tighten the enforcement of new arms deals. Riyadh may go to China, France or others to conclude military partnerships and deals.
Suppose Washington sees that the “oil-for-security” rule is no longer of the same importance as the need for Middle Eastern oil declines. In that case, it must admit that the actual ruler of the Kingdom today differs from previous leaders who were more cautious in their foreign policies. The young crown prince is keen to emerge as a strongman at home and more eager to gain the appropriate recognition, appreciation, and support from Washington.
He does not hide his vision that his country’s position, the growth of its regional influence and the emergence of countries competing with Washington on the world stage require Riyadh to reconsider the relationship in proportion to the size of its interests and status. This is what the Kingdom started, as it took – during his reign – bolder and clearer positions in regional and international files, as long as those who preceded him tried to distance the Kingdom from this trend.
Riyadh wants more American firmness in confronting Iran and its proxies in wars that are getting more dangerous day after day, the continuation of American support in the Yemeni war, and the disregard for human rights files as internal matters.
On the other hand, it requires Washington to re-evaluate the relationship with Riyadh with greater flexibility and accept a relationship closer to equality than absolute dependency, as the basis of interests is based on mutual benefits in a world of significant change and fluctuation.
Saudi-US relations: What next
American politicians consider the stance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the recent OPEC Plus meetings as an insult to US President Joe Biden, who visited Riyadh last July. And currently, they are busy defining the appropriate steps to deal with the Kingdom, indicating the start of a new chapter of tension between the two parties.
The Gulf House Center for Studies and Publishing said that despite Riyadh’s haste to justify the matter, it is difficult to be convinced that the agreement to set a production ceiling at the OPEC Plus meeting was purely technical, far from political calculations.
Energy, since the discovery of oil, has been a weapon in building alliances and directing political messages at the international level. Russia was not the first country to use energy as a weapon against the West during the current war in Ukraine.
In this context, it is difficult to digest the American accusation that Saudi Arabia chose to side with Russia in the conflict, as the Saudi position in the OPEC Plus meeting is consistent with the Kingdom’s view of itself as a country whose influence is growing in the world.
Currently, Saudi-US relations are at a critical juncture. Perhaps the most prominent problematic files are the Iranian and Yemeni files:
Concerning the Iranian file, Saudi Arabia is increasingly concerned about what Riyadh sees as the waning American interest in its security with the possibility of returning to the nuclear agreement signed with Iran in 2015, especially since the nuclear talks are only related to Iran’s nuclear program, and do not address the security threats posed by Tehran’s allies and proxies to Saudi interests and orientations in the Middle East.
Although the nuclear talks are currently frozen until after the midterm elections in the United States on November 8, Riyadh is apprehensive that Washington will make concessions in the upcoming rounds.
In the Yemeni file, the situation is not much different in terms of the difference in the two positions. The direct US intervention in Yemen dates back to 2002 when it began launching military strikes against the leaders of Al-Qaeda.
When the Saudi-led Decisive Storm broke out on March 26, 2015, to end the influence of the Houthis in the country, which had descended into a wide internal war, the US role was limited to providing logistical and intelligence support in conjunction with pressure on Riyadh to contribute to creating a peaceful settlement and ending the fighting between the rival Yemeni factions.
The Houthis’ strength did not weaken as Riyadh had hoped when its air raids launched on the group’s strongholds. Instead, Saudi territory became a primary target for the Houthis, which reached its climax on March 19-20, 2022, with the group targeting energy-related facilities in Jizan, Yanbu, Dhahran, and Khamis Mushait.
Thus, Saudi dissatisfaction with the American ally, which did not form the appropriate security umbrella to protect vital Saudi installations from targeting, increased.
Regarding the previous two files, some point to an issue that may seem very significant in its impact: the lack of appropriate chemistry between President Joe Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Former US diplomat Aaron David Miller, a senior researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, attributes the direct cause of the tension in Saudi-American relations to the rise of the crown prince, who emerged “as a cruel… and someone who submits to his rule in the matter.” It relates to the interests of the United States and American foreign policy to question,” as he described it.
During his run for the presidency, Joe Biden talked about Saudi Arabia as a pariah country. Then, one month after he arrived at the White House, in February 2021, he allowed the publication of the US intelligence report on the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
At that time, the relationship seemed to begin to take an upward trend, followed by Biden’s statement in October 2021, when he linked the rise in oil prices to record levels with Saudi Arabia and “a lot of people in the Middle East who want to talk to him.”
Then the Ukrainian war came to reshuffle the files, and in July of this year, Biden found himself flying on his presidential plane to Riyadh to meet the king and his son, the crown prince.
The move was a clear victory for bin Salman more than it was for Biden, who turned out to have reneged on many of his campaign pledges.
Bin Salman seems to view the American president with suspicion and sees – with the age difference – that time passes Biden and that the relationship with the United States is not based on partnership with personalities that may change after each electoral entitlement.
Accordingly, sending messages to Washington at an appropriate time does not hurt to be more careful in dealing with Riyadh’s interests, and there is no better timing for sending messages than the energy war waged by Russia and the approaching midterm elections in the United States that live on fears of inflation and high fuel prices.
According to researcher Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institution, “the rise in oil prices was a clear electoral interference by the Saudi crown prince on behalf of Donald Trump’s Republican party.”
And Saudi Arabia, since King Salman took power in 2015, seemed willing to conduct a process of evaluating the relationship with the United States, which is seen in the West as a “client relationship” based on the principle of “oil for security,” in which Riyadh guarantees the flow of oil to global markets, especially the American ones, while The United States is responsible for the security of the Kingdom and concludes huge arms deals with it.
The United States, which has become less dependent on Middle Eastern oil, has no interest in supporting internal conflicts or proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The emergence of China as a strategic player at the international level, the Russian war in Ukraine, and the danger of weapons of mass destruction are files that have become more important to Washington than the Middle East issues as long as the Abraham agreements between Israel and the Arab countries deepen day after day.
The danger that the relationship between Riyadh and Washington is going through is not that difficult to predict. Their relations had already gone through critical stages at different times. Still, they remained stable and refractory and did not follow a straight line since the meeting with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt with King Abdulaziz aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal in 1945.
Among its most prominent turning points: the oil embargo on the West during the 1973 war, the attacks of September 11, 2001, Washington’s abandonment of its historical ally President Hosni Mubarak during the January 2011 revolution, and the American position in general regarding the events of the so-called “Arab Spring.”
Washington may delay the delivery of Riyadh as a punishment for the results of OPEC Plus, defence equipment, or tighten the enforcement of new arms deals. Riyadh may go to China, France or others to conclude military partnerships and deals.
Suppose Washington sees that the “oil-for-security” rule is no longer of the same importance as the need for Middle Eastern oil declines. In that case, it must admit that the actual ruler of the Kingdom today differs from previous leaders who were more cautious in their foreign policies. The young crown prince is keen to emerge as a strongman at home and more eager to gain the appropriate recognition, appreciation, and support from Washington.
He does not hide his vision that his country’s position, the growth of its regional influence and the emergence of countries competing with Washington on the world stage require Riyadh to reconsider the relationship in proportion to the size of its interests and status. This is what the Kingdom started, as it took – during his reign – bolder and clearer positions in regional and international files, as long as those who preceded him tried to distance the Kingdom from this trend.
Riyadh wants more American firmness in confronting Iran and its proxies in wars that are getting more dangerous day after day, the continuation of American support in the Yemeni war, and the disregard for human rights files as internal matters.
On the other hand, it requires Washington to re-evaluate the relationship with Riyadh with greater flexibility and accept a relationship closer to equality than absolute dependency, as the basis of interests is based on mutual benefits in a world of significant change and fluctuation.
